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Abstract—With the advancement of communication, the 
spectrum shortage problem becomes a serious problem for 
future generations. The cognitive radio technology is 
proposed to address this concern. In cognitive radio 
networks, the secondary users can access spectrum that 
allocated to the primary users without interference to the 
operation of primary users. Using cognitive radio network 
raises security issues such as jamming attack. A 
straightforward strategy to counter the jamming attack is to 
switch other bands. Finding the best strategy for switching is 
complicated when the malicious user is unknown to the 
primary users. This paper uses fictitious game for analysis 
the defense against such an unknown jammer. 
Keywords—Cognitive Radio; Fictitious Play; Security; 
Game Theory; Jamming Attack; security  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The cognitive radio network (CRN) is introduced for 
next generation networks because of finite nature of the 
radio spectrum [1]. In CRN, secondary users can access to 
the frequency bands without interfering with primary users 
[2-3]. CRN as a new introduced technology raises security 
issues [4], such as jamming attack, which are needed to be 
addressed. To counter jamming attack, it is recommended 
to the secondary users to switch to other vacant bands 
when is jammed by the malicious users [5]. 
The optimal strategies against jamming attacks using 
Markov Decision Process (MDP) is proposed by Wu, 
Wang and Liu in [6]. Meamari et al. proposed a game 
theoretical method to analyze a coordinated jamming 
attack [7]. Tan, Sengupta and Subbalakshmi suggested a 
model to find the optimal bands of malicious users for 
switching [8]. Then, they utilized Markov model to 
demonstrate that the malicious users are more efficient 
against coordinated jamming attack than non-coordinated 
jamming attack.  
The fictitious play can be used to analyze the attack 
when there isn’t complete information about their rival [9]. 
the fictitious play is used to calculate the optimal strategies 
for different players of attack by Nguyen, Alpcan and 
Basar in [10].  
We considered a simple model of CRN in which there is 
only one secondary and one malicious user exist there. The 
secondary user transmits its information to proposed 
network while the malicious user wants to attack by 
jamming. Afterwards, the optimal strategies are calculated 
for both secondary and malicious users in an incomplete 
information situation.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 
II, the problem is described in addition to a static game for 
jamming attack. Section III calculates Nash equilibrium 
for secondary and malicious users in both situations of 
complete and partial information about the rival. 
Meanwhile, numerical results are studied in section IV. 
Section V provides the conclusions and addresses the 
future works.  
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
We consider a CRN with nN allocated spectrum bands. 
In this network, there are one secondary, one malicious 
and pn primary users. It is assumed that both malicious 
and secondary users know the number of primary users but 
they are unaware of their distribution in bands. Therefore, 
they suppose probability of occupation for each band by 
the primary user ( pBP ) in each time slot, similar to a 
uniform distribution which is calculated in (1): 
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Fig. 1. The priority of spectrum band sensing for the primary, secondary 
and malicious users 
In CRN, the primary users have higher priority over the 
secondary users to access to network. So the secondary 
users can’t use the network as long as the primary users are 
present. 
We proposed a discrete model to study CRN. In 
discrete-time model, time is divided into time slots and it 
assumed all users select their optimal action at the 
beginning of the time slots. Fig. 1 shows timing of the 
secondary, malicious and primary users to access to bands 
[6]. At the beginning of time slot, the secondary users 
sense the channel to discover whether the primary users 
are present or not. The secondary users can use the channel 
to send their information in absence of primary users. 
However, at the beginning of time slot, the malicious 
user senses the band to distinguish presence or absence of 
the secondary user. Thus the malicious user waits at the 
beginning of each time slots where the secondary users 
start to send information. If the malicious user finds the 
secondary user, he/she will jam to the secondary user. 
Otherwise, the malicious user searches other bands to 
locate the secondary user. It is assumed that disrupting 
communication of the secondary user is of great 
importance for the malicious user and it has also the ability 
to sense all bands in one time slot. The malicious user 
doesn’t need to sense the primary user because the task of 
the malicious user is to disturb communication of the 
secondary user.  
The malicious user can jam to the secondary user to 
disrupt its communication. When they are both in the same 
band, a simple strategy for the secondary user to prevent a 
jamming attack would be switching to other bands. 
However, the malicious user can switch between different 
bands to find the secondary user. Thus, game theory is 
used among malicious and secondary users in a typical 
jamming attack to analyze the interactions.  
Both secondary and malicious user may stay in their 
bands or switch to other bands. For game theoretical 
analysis, we should use gains and costs for both secondary 
and malicious users for their different actions [8]. mC and 
sC are the cost values of malicious and secondary users for 
switching to other bands, respectively. Gain value of the 
malicious user by performing a successful jamming attack 
is denoted by mG . On the other hand, gain value of the 
secondary user to communicate in bands without either 
malicious or primary users is shown by sG . Since to 
reestablish a communication has some costs for the 
secondary user, If a secondary user is jammed with the 
malicious user, it will lost sL According to availability of 
the secondary, malicious and primary users, there are 
different states for bands.  
In some states, the secondary and malicious users don’t 
have adequate information about the band of rivals while 
they are aware of this band in other states. Depending on 
the bands of rivals are known or not, these states are 
classified to three categories. It was demonstrated that 
analysis of the interaction on the malicious and secondary 
users is similar for different states of each category. 
Thereby, the three categories could be presented in 
addition to game theoretical analysis of the jamming attack 
in each category.  
A. Category A (Aware – Aware) 
In Category A, the band of rival is known for both 
secondary and malicious users. Only one of the six states 
has a situation similar to category A that is shown in fig. 
2a.  
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Fig. 2. Different states for the bands 
This state, when the secondary user is jammed with 
malicious user and has lost sL . In this situation, for next 
time slot, the secondary user should decide to stay in the 
band or try to find a vacant band to switch. Also the 
malicious user should opt to stay in the band or switch to 
another band for finding the secondary user in the next 
time slot. Thus both secondary and malicious users have 
two possible strategies in category A: staying in their band 
or switching to other band with uniform distribution. 
Based on fig.1, both secondary and malicious users should 
select their strategy at the beginning of slot time 
simultaneously, so their interaction could be modeled whit 
a static game.  
To analysis of the jamming attack for category A, a 
static game is used. First the utility functions of malicious 
and secondary users are calculated which are summarized 
in table I. In table I, jsP is the occupation probability of a 
band Just with the Secondary user in absence of both 
primary and malicious users, which is calculated by (2). 
 
TABLE I. THE UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IN CATEGORY A 
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TABLE II. THE UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IN CATEGORY B 
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In (2), 
1
1
−Nn
is the occupation probability of other bands 
with the malicious user when he/she switches to other 
bands. Meanwhile jsmP , in table I is the occupation 
probability of other bands Just with Secondary and 
Malicious users in absence of the primary user, which is 
given by (3). 
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B. Category B (Aware – Unaware)  
In category B, the band of secondary user is known for 
the malicious user whereas the band of malicious user in 
unknown for the secondary user and we noted it with 
(Aware – Unaware). Two states out of six states have the 
situation of category B and are showed in fig. 2b and fig. 
2c. The malicious user in category B first searches for the 
secondary user in its band and doesn’t find it, so the 
malicious user should sense other bands to find the band of 
secondary user.  
The cause of sensing other bands is that the malicious 
user wants to identify the band of secondary user and 
increase his/her chance for a successful jamming in the 
next time slot. However the secondary user doesn’t know 
the band of malicious user, he/she is aware that the 
malicious user knows his/her band. The secondary user 
doesn’t sense other bands for discovering the band of 
malicious user because the secondary user is aware that the 
malicious user doesn’t send jamming signal in situations of 
category B.  
The secondary user has two choices in category B: 
switch to other bands with uniform distribution; or stay in 
his/her current band. Although the malicious user has two 
strategies: staying in his/her band; or switching to the band 
of secondary user.  
The malicious user doesn’t have any other choice for 
switching to other bands (except of his/her band and the 
band of secondary user), because the malicious user knows 
that the secondary user will switches to another band with 
uniform distribution, so the malicious user has equal 
chance to jam the secondary user in these bands. Analysis 
of attack for category B can be model by a static game. 
The utility functions are listed in table II.  
C. Category C (Unaware – Unaware) 
In category C, both secondary and malicious users are 
unfamiliar with the band of rival and we noted it with 
(Unaware – Unaware). Three states out of six states are 
placed in category C, which are shown in fig. 2d, fig. 2e 
and fig. 2f.  
In various situations of category C, the malicious user 
senses his/her band as well as other bands to find the band 
of secondary user, while the malicious user doesn’t find 
the band of secondary user because the secondary user 
doesn’t transmit any information toward the channel. Thus, 
the malicious user knows that secondary and primary users 
are located in the same band. Meanwhile, the secondary 
user is unaware about the band of malicious user. 
Secondary and malicious users don’t have any 
information about the band of rival in category C, so it is 
rational for them to stay in their band and not to waste their 
energy for switching to other bands. As a result, the 
optimal strategy for secondary and malicious users would 
be to stay in their band for the next time slot. Since the 
primary users occupy the bands having uniform 
distribution, the network can be changed to category A and 
B for the next time slot. The state of the network is one of 
6 states or one of 3 categories. For next time slot, state of 
the network can change to another categories or stay 
without change. Fig.3 depicts these three categories with 
transitions of the network among them.  
Obviously, interaction between malicious and secondary 
users is based on complete/partial information about the 
rival. So, one must analyze the jamming attack in both 
complete and partial information.  
III. THE PROPOSED GAME 
First, we consider a situation with complete information 
about rival’s cost and gain. So, we should analyze a simple 
static game. Then we analyze an unknown jamming attack 
and show that two Nash equilibriums are equal. The 
method of calculating Nash equilibrium is similar for these 
two categories, so we used from a, b, c, d, e, f, g and h (in 
table III) instead of utility functions to solve the Nash 
Equilibrium for both categories A and B. For example a is 
equal ( ) ( )s s j s s j smC G P L P− +  −   in category A (from 
table I) and is equal ( ) ( )s s j s s j smC G P L P− +  −   in category 
B (from table II).   
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Fig. 3. Different categories for the network Nash equilibrium 
For solving this simple static game (table III), it is 
assumed that the secondary user selects his/her first 
strategy with probability p  while the malicious user 
chooses his/her first strategy with probability q . If the 
secondary user selects his/her first strategy, then it would 
have a utility value of 1sU . So, if the secondary user 
chooses his/her second strategy, then it has a utility value 
equal to 2sU . 1sU and 2sU are calculated in (4) and (5), 
respectively.  
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  Similarly, 1mU and 2mU are utilities of the malicious user, 
when choosing his/her first and second strategies, 
respectively.   
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Nash equilibrium for a static game occurs when utilities 
of the first strategy and the second strategy are equal. 
Thus: 
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TABLE III. THE UTILITY FUNCTIONS FOR DIFFERENT 
STRATEGIES 
Second strategy First strategy 
Malicious  
Secondary 
fb,
 
ea,  First strategy 
hd , gc,  Second strategy 
Secondary and malicious user may have no information 
about cost of the rival and gain values. For example, when 
the new malicious user enters the network, both secondary 
and malicious users would have partial information about 
his/her rival.  
In this situation (partial information), we can use 
learning games like fictitious play to calculate Nash 
equilibrium. Fictitious play is a historical-based game in 
which both malicious and secondary users should save 
some information about their rival.    
For this reason, it is supposed that 1sh  and 2sh  are the 
number of times that the secondary user chooses his/her 
first and second strategies, respectively and the malicious 
user should count 1sh  and 2sh . Meanwhile, 1mh  and 2mh  
are the number of times that the malicious user selects 
his/her first and second strategies, respectively and the 
secondary user should count 1mh  and 2mh .  
At the beginning of each stage in this game, the 
secondary user calculates the expected utility for choosing 
his/her first exsU 1 ) and second (
ex
sU 2 ) strategies like (10) and 
(11), respectively [11]. 
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If exs
ex
s UU 21  , then the secondary user should choose the 
first strategy. Also, when exs
ex
s UU 21  , the secondary user 
should adopt the second strategy. Thus, when exs
ex
s UU 21 = , 
the secondary user should randomly select between first 
and second strategies. 
Moreover, the malicious user calculates the expected 
utility for choosing his/her first ( exm1U )and second (
ex
m2U ) 
strategies based on (12) and (13), respectively. 
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Similarly, when exm
ex
m UU 21   , the malicious user should 
pick the first strategy. If exm
ex
m UU 21  , the malicious user 
should select the second strategy and when exm
ex
m UU 21 = , 
the -malicious user should follow his/her first and second 
choices randomly. With this algorithm, *p and *q could be 
calculated from (14) and (15) for partial information 
situation, respectively.  
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It can be proved that by increasing the number of 
repetitions for a category, *p and *q  for the partial 
information situation will converge to p and q  for 
complete information situation, respectively [11]. This 
convergence is also shown in the numerical results.    
Fig. 3 depicts change in the status of network for three 
categories. So, with the previously mentioned algorithm 
for fictitious play, the secondary (malicious) user in each 
of A and B categories, observes and saves actions of the 
malicious (secondary) user. It is important to notice that 
each of the categories A and B have their own history 
about the action of rival. For example, if they are located 
in one of the two states of category B (fig. 2b and fig. 2c), 
they should save the action of rival in the history of 
category B. Obviously they don’t save the action of rival 
for category C because their optimal strategy is to stay in 
their bands there. Also when they are in state of category 
A, its history will be complete. 
The observations of secondary and malicious user about 
the action of rival are rather partial. If the state of network 
is A and in the next time slot it is A again, both secondary 
and malicious users will be aware about actions of each 
other. Thus they keep actions in the history of state A. If 
state of network is A and in the next time slot it is B, 
actions of secondary and malicious users will be known for 
both of them. Thus they keep actions in the history of state 
B. When the state of network is changed from state A to B 
or remains in state B in the coming slot time, the malicious 
user observes action of the secondary user and updates 
his/her history of states A and B.  
For the abovementioned situation, the secondary user 
can view actions of the malicious user if stays in its own 
state for the next time slot. If the secondary user switches 
to other bands in the next time slot, it cannot view actions 
of the malicious user. Therefore, histories of the secondary 
user are usually rather smaller than those of the malicious 
user. This causes the secondary user to reach Nash 
equilibrium later than the secondary user. 
In other states, secondary and malicious users can’t 
observe the actions of each other and they can’t either 
update their history. 
However, when the network is in state C or switches 
from state C to other states, they don’t need to record their 
actions of rival because they know their optimal strategy in 
state C. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
This section will discuss the numerical results of 
jamming attacks. Initial values for various parameters used 
in this analysis were: 10=Nn , 5=pn , 5=sC , 
2=mC , 50=sG , 75=mG and 100=sL . 
According to the initial values used before as well as (8) 
and (9), the Nash equilibrium for categories A and B are 
94.0=p and 84.0=q , and 85.0=p and 85.0=q , respectively.  
Fig. 4 and fig. 5 show the convergence of fictitious play 
to Nash equilibrium for secondary and malicious users in 
both categories A and B. For secondary and malicious 
users, the strategy of fictitious play is different from Nash 
equilibrium in the early stages. But by increasing stages of 
game and updating their histories, their strategies will 
approach much closer to Nash equilibrium.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The CR network is introduced to solve the problem of 
small spectrum band for data transmission. Jamming attack 
is one of the common security problems in CR networks. 
In this paper, a game theoretical model is proposed to 
analyze the jamming attack.  
In the proposed model, it has been shown how 
secondary and malicious users can obtain the maximum 
utility simultaneously. Meanwhile, behaviors of secondary 
and malicious users were analyzed, when there is partial 
information about rival.  
The results show that by increasing the history of 
attacks, the equilibrium of game in converged to the Nash 
equilibrium, thus this game is suitable when the 
information of attack is partial. 
Malicious users can join together to conduct a 
cooperative attack against CR. Analysis of such a 
cooperative attack is recommended for future works.  
 
Fig. 4. Convergence of the secondary and malicious user’s strategies in 
category A 
 
Fig. 5. Convergence of the secondary and malicious user’s strategies in 
category B 
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